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Abstract 
Free and open source software activities involve and, perhaps, evolve institutions 
(rules, norms and standards) that influence the formation, growth, and demise of 
communities.  Community institutions are attractors for some individuals while 
discouraging other individuals from entering or continuing to participate.  Their 
suitability may change as a community grows.  This paper examines the institutions of 
the Debian community where issues of community identity, distribution of authority, 
and decentralisation have facilitated growth and development.  These same 
institutions have also resulted in conflicts regarding community purposes and the 
quality and delivery of the community’s output. We examine the institutional redesign 
undertaken to address these problems and derive implications for F/LOS communities 
and companies. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper employs the concepts of epistemic community, situated learning and 
legitimate peripheral participation to address the way in which communities of F/LOS 
(Free/Libre Open Source Software) developers define their purposes, co-ordinate their 
activities and recruit new members, as well as the processes by which these novices 
are socialised.2 This framework is drawn from the literature on political science 
(Haas, 1992), scientific communities (Knorr Cetina, 1999) and communities of 
practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991), (Brown and Duguid, 1991).  It was first employed 
to the study of F/LOS by Edwards (2001) as a means of focussing on F/LOS 
communities’ social features and work practices.  This focus is neglected in a large 
part of the existing literature, which primarily concentrates on individual motives for 
participation in F/LOS projects and the advantages of the F/LOS methodology when 
compared with traditional (closed) paradigms for software development.3 These 
existing approaches are most often set in a context in which F/LOS projects are 
relatively successful and untroubled.  Edwards’ framework contributes to the opening 
of the “black box” of the F/LOS project, and we believe can be applied to contexts 
where we observe the presence of dysfunctional processes with a negative impact on 
performance and participation expectations, something that is quite common and also 
contrary to the sample of cases analysed by most researchers studying F/LOS 
communities. 
 
In extending and applying this framework to the specific case of the Debian Project, 
we aim to illustrate its relevance for analysing the social structures of F/LOS 
communities and for diagnosing some of their possible ills and to draw some 
conclusions regarding what institutions (rules, norms, and standards) might best serve 
such communities. 
 
                                                
2 Throughout this paper we use the term “Free/Libre Open Source” software (F/LOS), to refer to our 
subject of analysis in order to acknowledge both the more politicised (“Free/Libre”) faction of 
developers organised around the Free Software Foundation (http://www.fsf.org/), and the more 
pragmatic “Open” community which emerged with the launch of the Open Source Initiative 
(http://www.opensource.org/). 
3 For work focusing on the motivations of F/LOS developers see, for example, Raymond (1999), 
Lerner and Tirole (2000), Ghosh (1998), von Hippel (2002), Bezroukov (1999) or Himanen et al 
(2001). For some analyses of the comparative efficiencies of F/LOS and other paradigms for software 
development see Raymond (1999), von Hippel (2002) and Varian and Shapiro (2004).  
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The advantages of F/LOS projects are often depicted as a departure from a central 
tenet of existing theories of software development – ‘Brooks law.’ Brooks (1995) 
asserted that software development is subject to diminishing returns with the addition 
of greater number of developers.  By contrast, F/LOS development is usually 
characterised by its advocates (and many scholars) as an activity that is subject to 
proportional or more than proportional increases in outputs (quantity and quality of 
the software code produced) as more developers become involved in a project. This 
deviation from conventional accounts of software development is explained by what 
Eric Raymond calls “Linus’s Law,” according to which “Given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow”4.  This ‘law’ is focussed on one feature of the F/LOS development 
process – the problem of producing reliable code to implement clearly specified 
requirements, and on one consistent feature of software development – the un-
intentioned introduction of error in code production.  This is an important, but by no 
means, sole determinant of the success of the organisational innovation that F/LOS 
represents. 
 
For example it does how contentions that may be offered by the people behind the 
eyeballs are validated or how F/LOS communities might seek to recruit individuals 
with the most acute and relevant vision to the tasks at hand.  In this paper we examine 
how these issues of validation and recruitment play out in one setting, the Debian 
F/LOS community, which has faced and continues to face challenges that may affect 
its prospects for continued success. 
 
We begin the paper by presenting a theoretical framework which, along the lines 
followed by Edwards, begins with the concepts of Epistemic Community, Situated 
Learning and Legitimate Peripheral Participation, and uses these concepts to pursue a 
more detailed analysis of the role and functions of a project’s ‘administrator’ – one of 
several roles that emerge from the socio-technical and epistemological dynamics of 
the Debian project, and more broadly, F/LOSS communities.  These dynamics also 
produce institutions (rules, norms and standards) that regulate participation inside a 
project as well as managing conflict and dissension which might diminish the quality 
of a project’s outputs (and social processes). This discussion leads to the identification 
                                                
4 In an extended form,  “Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost every 
problem will be characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone” (Raymond 1999), p. 41.  
 4 
of some mileposts in the evolution of a project, each of which suggests the need for 
institutional strategies in order to cope with the growth of the technical and social 
complexity of the project. We then use this framework to consider the case of the 
Debian Linux Distribution, using primary data from its mailing lists archives, 
handbooks written to inform potential and actual community members, and previous 
analyses of institutional evolution and political conflict in this project. 
 
1. F/LOS development as a communitarian process 
 
Kasper Edwards (2001) builds a conceptual framework based upon analytical tools 
borrowed from the fields of political science and sociology in order to analyse the 
social organisation of F/LOS communities.  Of particular interest in his analysis are 
the processes by which novices enter such communities and learn the technical skills 
and social norms that make their participation meaningful and valuable. In order to 
undertake this task he employs the concepts of “epistemic communities” and “situated 
learning,” which we now briefly reprise. 
 
Epistemic communities and Situated Learning 
 
Haas (1992) introduces the concept of  “epistemic communities” in the field of 
political science to identify groups of individuals who share a number of normative 
and causal beliefs and knowledge validity notions.  Individuals in epistemic 
communities are in implicit or explicit agreement about the objectives of the 
community.  In the case of Haas’ domain of application, international policy, this is 
achieved through the accumulation of a body of knowledge, which is expected to 
influence policy makers’ decisions in a desired direction.  A central feature of Haas’ 
approach is that a shared epistemological framework regulates the knowledge 
accumulation process by establishing which methodologies and criteria are taken as 
most useful for the production and validation of knowledge. 
 
This framework seems particularly well suited for the analysis of the organisational 
arrangements adopted by participants in F/LOS projects because of its focus on 
collective work practices and their linkages to a specific epistemological framework, 
and the characterisation of a common “policy” enterprise as one of the essential 
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features of the community.  This instrumental approach for the definition of social 
interactions makes it possible to encompass the “socially-light” and “intimacy-averse” 
environment in which a considerable share of F/LOS development takes place.5  
Edwards locates the emergence of socialisation and identity in relation to the process 
of open source working, and introduces Lave and Wenger’s (1991) framework as the 
analytical method for comprehending this process. 
 
The practices, values and beliefs that characterise F/LOS development and the 
interactions between those people who take part in it6 create an environment that 
reduces the costs of re-negotiating purposes and facilitates decentralised collaboration 
between volunteers from heterogeneous backgrounds.  The epistemic community 
approach provides little guidance, however, in answering the question: how do 
outsiders start participation in the community, and through which processes do they 
learn and internalise the community’s set of shared normative and causal beliefs, 
notions of validity and goals that substantiate their membership?  
 
To address this issue, Edwards utilises Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concepts of 
“situated learning” and “legitimate peripheral participation.” This leads him to 
identify a number of activities and structures through which novices start their 
participation in the social and technical spaces of a project and learn the norms and 
policies that regulate behaviour inside them7. Of particular note, Edwards 
controversially construes the “mentor” (a pivotal figure in Lave and Wenger’s case 
studies) – the novice is ‘guided’ by what is embedded in the code, mailing lists and 
forum postings that the novice reads, adapts and contributes rather than an individual.8 
                                                
5 Respondents to FLOSS Survey (Ghosh et al., 2002) and the Boston Consulting Group Hacker Survey 
(Lakhani et al., 2002) emphasise acquisition of new skills and engagement in intellectually stimulating 
activities as the primary aspects for participation in F/LOS development, while social aspects remain 
secondary.  
6 Examples of which would be aversion to proprietary methods for software development, an emphasis 
on technical arguments during discussions and a disregard for “formal” qualifications and 
organisational, social or economic status. See Levy (1985) and Himanen (2001) for overviews of the 
moral precepts that constitute the basis of the F/LOS movement, also referred to as “the Hacker Ethic”. 
7 See Von Krogh et al (2003) for an empirical analysis of some of the joining and specialisation 
patterns through which novices start participation in the Freenet project.  
8 Taking this view involves the supposition that the individual identities of insiders have effectively 
“coalesced” into these artefacts as part of a collective, decentralised development process, an 
assumption that many who are sympathetic to Lave and Wenger’s framework will find problematic 
since it strips out and objectifies the interactive social processes involving the novice and the mentor 
into a relation between the novice and the ‘text.’  As we will see below, however, interactivity is re-
introduced as the novice attempts to make contributions to the community effort. 
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Through this social process the novice may come to internalise the values of the 
community and learn how contributions are solicited and validated as well as the 
norms that regulate social interactions inside the community.  Eventually, the novice 
becomes recognised by others as a member of the community and may influence the 
community through contributions to software code, documentation, technical 
discussions, Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) lists, etc. 
 
2. Distributed authority inside an epistemic community and knowledge 
differentials as its organising principle 
 
Edwards’ framework is a useful starting point for the analysis of the organisational 
arrangements through which F/LOS communities carry out their activities, as it 
identifies mechanisms in projects that address some of the pitfalls of decentralised 
software development and, more generally, online interaction9. .  Elliot and Scacchi’s 
analysis of the GNUe documentation project concurs with this view, describing the 
way in which an alignment of participants’ belief systems mitigates conflict.10 We 
contend that these mechanisms are neither precise nor strong enough to effectively 
specify the goals and organise the efforts of F/LOS developers, nor necessarily 
sufficient to resolve conflicts that emerge on the day-to-day processes of F/LOS 
development.  In these areas, the exercise of authority becomes a necessary source of 
stability and direction, which prompts the following discussion of authority in such 
communities. 
                                                
9 See Herbsleb et al (2000) for an appraisal of the problems faced by (commercial) software projects 
undertaken by dislocated teams.  
10 Elliot and Scacchi (2003). 
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The exercise of authority in F/LOS development work11 
 
Academic accounts of F/LOS development often present a ‘flat’ hierarchical structure 
in which volunteers take the initiative of contributing software modules (fragments of 
a program) that are integrated with each other through standardised interfaces12.  Our 
contention is that the process of integration is more complicated than strategies for 
integration of contributions play an essential role in determining the outcomes of a 
project.  The organisational structure of most F/LOS projects has a vertical 
component which regulates its development and operation. 
 
One figure common in F/LOS projects who embodies these integration functions is 
the administrator (elsewhere referred to as ‘leader’ or ‘maintainer’). The administrator 
of a project is, in Eric Raymond’s terms, its ‘owner’, that is, the individual who starts 
it, inherits it from a previous owner or recovers it from abandonment, and has the 
right to distribute its official version.13 Raymond does not focus on the function 
preceding the exercise of this “right to release”, this is, the right to decide which 
contributions go inside the official version and which do not, or the “integration 
function. Technocratic accounts of F/LOSS development would perhaps present this 
as a trivial undertaking that does not deserve special attention: the project 
administrator simply assembles the “puzzle” of the software program with the 
“pieces” contributed following the rules and principles that characterise the F/LOS 
epistemic community.  If a software project is large and technically complex, this 
might be a difficult task, and because of the voluntary nature of F/LOS development 
work, some of the “spaces in the puzzle” (i.e. tedious tasks such as debugging and 
documentation) may not be completed in a timely way.14 Nevertheless, by a 
technocratic account, there exists a “right” solution for the software problem, which 
the administrator will adopt, with guidance from the community when necessary. If 
she does not, she will eventually face a rebellion from other developers, who have the 
                                                
11 We do not enter on issues related to the definition of for example, authority versus influence and 
power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963): in our framework, we use this concept to refer to attempts at 
influencing the actions of other participants in the project. 
12 This is, a Raymondian Bazaar (see Raymond, 1999).  
13 Raymond (1999). 
14 Ibid. 
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capacity to leave the project and to start a different branch (to “fork” the project) 
adopting the “right solution” that the administrator declined to adopt.15  
 
Accounts such as this seem naïve to social process and incorporate a technologically 
deterministic view of software development which appears prevalent in ICT-savvy 
circles (and sometimes, amongst social analysts of ICT).  Alternatively, we contend 
that the “software puzzle” we have described presents, except in its simplest 
configurations, a diversity of possible “solutions,” each with merits and shortcomings. 
In a context of uncertainty and diversity (i.e. heterogeneous, sometimes conflicting 
individual goals and perspectives), there is space for choice about how to solve the 
puzzle, which arrangements of “software pieces” are more desirable, and also for 
differences between individuals about which solutions should be employed.16 Our 
understanding of development processes in F/LOS projects adds a cautionary 
corollary to Linus’ Laws; “Given enough opinions, all development paths are 
contested” 
 
Decisions about which contributions and strategies are more useful for the solution of 
a problem, which issues should be considered problems and which should not, and the 
criteria according to which solutions to problems are to be judged are, in a context of 
uncertainty, made on the basis of values, beliefs and opinions.  Since the rules, 
precepts and “shared goals” of a F/LOS epistemic community are not defined in a 
sufficiently rigorous or complete way so as to dispel the need to make frequent 
decisions with a degree of arbitrariness, exercises of authority cannot be completely 
based on rational and technical arguments.  If these rules defined perfect protocols (in 
economic terms, complete contracts) for conflict resolution with no individual making 
an ‘arbitrary decision’, it would still be true that the selection of the goals and values 
embedded in them constitute, again, exercises of authority.  
 
                                                
15 This sort of explanation is implicit in Raymond (1999) who assumes that a meritocratic process of 
leader selection and the existence of ‘checks and balances’ provided by capacity to ‘fork’ (take existing 
code and develop it in a different way) guarantee the selection of optimal development paths. Similar 
explanations of F/LOS efficiency based on the allocation of stocks of information about user needs are 
present in von Hippel (2002). 
16 Discussions in developer mailing lists (i.e. http://www.lists.debian.org) and forums (such as Slashdot 
or Kuro5hin) demonstrate the extent of disagreements about the relative merits of different programs 
and techniques, and the desirability of achieving different goals permeate day-to-day development 
activities in the F/LOS community.  
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The source of authority in F/LOS projects: knowledge differentials between 
individuals 
 
The previous discussion shows the importance of situating authority at the foreground 
of our understanding of F/LOS communities and their activities: determining its 
sources constitutes a promising approach to the understanding of the organisation of 
F/LOS projects. 
 
We contend that individuals obtain the right to exercise authority over a project’s 
development process by demonstrating superior knowledge about it, and that this 
knowledge is acquired through participation.  By focussing on the social dynamics 
through which this knowledge is distributed throughout a project, it becomes possible 
to trace the emergence of the structure, usually hierarchical, by which development 
efforts inside are managed.  Our analysis complements and extends previous research 
on the issue, much of which has concentrated on the motives for individuals’ 
contributions and have highlighted reputation building.17 
 
Inside our framework, “contributions” are not, per se, direct sources of reputation and 
authority in a project, but demonstrations of knowledge about its goals and its values, 
and of the skills necessary to fulfil a useful role inside its community.  In a social 
milieu where sustaining a common purpose may be difficult and in which technical 
proficiency is given the utmost value, these demonstrations are rewarded with 
reputation, whose ‘exchange value’ is the right to exercise authority over the project 
and, if not its participants, then at least their contributions.18 This line of reasoning is 
more fruitful for analysing the social dynamics inside F/LOS communities than the 
“Gift Culture” metaphor adduced by Raymond.  We consider authority as the 
embodiment of a community’s respect and trust for the dedication and technical 
proficiency of those individuals who, through their sustained involvement in the 
project, have demonstrated that they know better, not as some sort of deference to the 
reputation and property rights of more active or experienced developers. 
                                                
17 Raymond (1999), Lerner and Tirole (2000). 
18 It is important to emphasise that the knowledge we are referring to is both technical (that is, about 
software development and design), social (about the processes through which the community carries 
out its activities and the social norms that regulate interactions between participants) and “political” 
(about the goals of the community and preferred ways of achieving them)  
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If, as we argue, the essential source of authority in a project is knowledge of purpose 
and technique (acquired and demonstrated through participation), then the community 
will also be, to a degree, resistant to opportunistic behaviours aimed at maximising 
individual reputations or manipulating the direction of its project. 
 
 
Distributed Authority 
 
Our analysis has so far amounted to an identification of “institutional frameworks” 
(norms of an epistemic community), “membership acquisition processes” (through 
legitimate peripheral participation) and “governance” (the accumulation of decision-
making authority).  These three elements constitute the structure through which the 
efforts of a decentralised and heterogeneous community of volunteers are coordinated 
and focussed inside F/LOS projects. In the simplest instantiation of this model, all 
three of these elements are controlled directly or indirectly by the project 
administrator, whose authority arises from her (perceived) superior knowledge of the 
project. The authority to delegate, or to distribute authority, however, is an essential 
aspect of the project administrator’s authority, and the source of the emergence of 
organisational hierarchies such as the star-shaped structure characterising Linux, or 
the team-based model followed by the BSD Unix project19.  
 
We contend that this authority delegation process is an inevitable consequence of the 
growth in the size and complexity of a project, and of the diversity of the population 
participating in it.  As new developers enter a project and specialise in different areas, 
they implicitly appropriate these areas through their contributions, obtaining de facto 
responsibility over them. If a conflict emerges between the project administrator and 
an expert in an area where the latter is perceived to be more knowledgeable, the 
absence of clear criteria to determine who has the ultimate right to decide will result 
in confusion.20.  An administrator’s delegation of authority to developers who have a 
                                                
19 Moody (2002) and Weber (2004) characterise the GNU/Linux organisational model. See Bezroukov 
(1999) for quotes from a former BSD Unix developer defending its centralised development model, as 
well as Jørgensen (2001).  
20 See Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller (2002) and Moody (2002) for an account of this kind of conflict 
in the context of the GNU/Linux and Emacs projects.  
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history of high quality contributions is one way of addressing limitations in the ‘span 
of control’ in being well informed about the evolution of “her” project across a 
multitude of fronts. This authority is exercised by decisions about an individual’s 
contributions to a project (either incorporating or rejecting them) which implies the 
acceptance or denial of that individual’s access to the community.  Persistent 
acceptance of contributions in an area eventually leads to the developer become a ‘de 
facto’ owner of it. This process will contribute to reducing the scope and intensity of 
controversies, inasmuch this delegation will be based on trust and experience.  It also 
suggests that the administrator will delegate her authority on developers who are 
aligned with her goals and values, and with whom she is less likely to conflict.  This 
is clearly a process of social structuration through accretion. 
 
As Linus Torvalds, administrator of the GNU/Linux kernel development team 
explains in a mailing list: 
 
“I take stuff that I feel is good. Often that feeling of goodness 
comes from trusting the person who sends it to me, simply by past 
performance. At other times, it is because I think the feature is 
cool, or well done, or whatever. Hint: if you want stuff in my tree, 
make me trust you. Or work on things that I feel are innately 
interesting. Don't bother dragging me into your flame-wars and 
trying to convince me that I ‘must’ apply your patches.”21  
 
The conceptual framework we have elaborated in this section has important 
implications:  F/LOS development comprises technological, social and institutional 
aspects, which in our framework could be respectively referred to as 
“design/modularity”, “learning/reputation” and “governance/membership”, and their 
interaction will be an essential determinant of project policy and success22. Although 
we acknowledge the existence of F/LOS projects that function according to other 
organisational structures not necessarily based on the delegation of authority from an 
                                                
21 http://www.lib.uaa.alaska.edu/linux-kernel/archive/2002-Week-44/0094.html  
22 Defining project success is a difficult task (see Crowston et al, 2003), although we would lean 
towards a definition that encompasses not only technical performance but also community 
sustainability. 
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administrator, we hypothesise that their emergence can be traced using the conceptual 
framework we have presented before. 
 
In the following section we undertake a case study of one such project, Debian, with 
the aim of illuminating the relationships between the latter two spheres and 
substantiating the claims that we have introduced in the preceding analysis. It is one 
of our contentions that the absence of clear mechanisms for the exercise of authority 
in this project, including this delegation, that have become sources of conflict inside 
it. 
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3. Social Conflict and Organisational Structure in the Debian Community 
 
In this section we develop a case study of the Debian GNU/Linux distribution to 
provide an empirical content to the preceding conceptual and theoretical discussion.  
The Debian community was chosen rather than some other F/LOS community 
because 1) the process of deciding to include or exclude a package in the distribution 
is less complex and this unit of analysis affords greater comparability than analysis of 
‘submits’ of code fragments in a F/LOS community based upon coding, 2) the Debian 
community has grown in size and complexity over time sufficiently to trigger 
institutional evolution, and 3) the Debian community has devoted considerable 
(public) effort to a reflexive discussion of its purposes and methods. 
 
The case study was developed, and is presented, in two stages.  First, we investigate 
the stated aims and philosophy, organisational structure and development practices of 
the Debian community. Having done this, we examine its institutional evolution 
through a literature review and an analysis of available evidence including relevant 
news items and, when possible, primary evidence extracted from mailing lists, online 
forums and other public discussions. In this second stage, we focus on periods of 
instability that have led to the emergence of new organisational roles and structures to 
co-ordinate development efforts and regulate participation inside the project.  This 
approach is inductive in that it works back from manifestations of change to their 
possible sources and consequences.  By focussing on episodes in which organisational 
change occurs, we are attempting balance expressions of dissent (which may be more 
or less continuous within the community) with statements defending current practice 
because, at the points of our analysis, the possibility of change of these practices is 
under active discussion.  Nonetheless, this methodology is not capable of producing 
systematic evidence about continuity, the periods in which dissent exists but is not 
mobilised into widespread or actively debated calls for or enactment of change. 
Finally, in the section entitle Analysis, we examine this historical account using as an 
analytical prism the concepts and analytical tools presented in the previous section. 
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Introducing Debian 
 
The Debian project is a GNU/Linux distribution (a collection of F/LOS software 
programs integrated with an operating system) that  was launched in August 1993. 23 
Debian is developed by volunteers working in a decentralised fashion, and made 
available for free.  Unlike several other distributions, Debian has not distributed a 
‘value added’ package with user-friendly installer software, manuals, and CD or DVD 
images of the software.24 
 
The Debian community has avowed its commitment to the F/LOS philosophy with the 
institution of the Debian Social Contract and the Debian Free Software Guidelines 
(DFSG) which respectively codify the moral agenda of the project (to develop a 
F/LOS Operating System that performs up to the highest standards of quality) and 
define a number of F/LOS criteria with which the license of all the software included 
in the distribution must comply.25 
 
The organisation of Debian 26 
 
As we have mentioned, Debian is a distribution: its developers do not “code”, but 
“maintain packages” (initially developed by “Upstream Authors” who are not, 
usually, part of the community), an activity that involves reviewing those packages 
and integrating them into a release. These packages (4,500 source packages as of the 
release of Debian 3.0 and over 18,000 in Debian 4.0) contain the software 
components that comprise an Operating System, as well as many other tools and 
applications (i.e. desktop environment, web-browser, database management, word 
processor etc.)27. Each maintainer is responsible for guaranteeing that her package 
                                                
23 See Murdock (1993). 
24 Debian does identify companies that serve some of these functions for users and notes that these 
companies make a financial contributions to the Debian effort 
25 The Debian Free Software Guidelines constitute the kernel of the Open Source Definition. See 
http://www.debian.org/social_contract (Debian Social Contract),  
http://www.debian.org/social_contract#guidelines (Debian Free Software Guidelines) and 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition_plain.html (Open Source Definition).. 
26 See Michlmayr (2003) for a more detailed overview of Debian’s organisation. 
27 For more data about the size of different Debian distributions and its evolution, see Robles and 
González-Barahona (2003).  
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contains high quality software that fits coherently with the rest of the distribution, and 
is licensed under terms complying with the Debian Free Software Guidance (DFSG). 
 
Maintainers upload packages to the Debian Archive, where they are checked for 
consistency using automated scripts, and reviewed by an FTP Master who assesses 
their basic quality and copyright status.28. The packages that are accepted are, 
depending on their level of reliability, incorporated to a file repository29: The project’s 
Release Manager periodically “freezes” a sub-set of the packages in the most reliable 
repository, which are then subject to further testing and eventually released as the 
“stable Debian distribution”. 
 
Teams such as Security or Quality Assurance take care of specific issues when the 
need arises, such as when vulnerabilities in the code are detected or a package is 
‘orphaned’ by its maintainer.30. 
 
A second institutional aspect that characterises Debian is the New Maintainer Process 
(NMP) through which individuals outside the project become maintainers.31 The 
NMP begins with the verification of an applicant’s identity and an assessment of her 
technical expertise and understanding and commitment to Debian’s norms and 
values32. The NMP usually takes several months to complete and has its own 
organisational apparatus. 
 
Another essential element of Debian’s organisation is an “officership” in charge of 
decision-making and conflict-resolution, with a structure established in the Debian 
Constitution (first ratified in its version 1.0 on December 1998). 33The Debian 
Project Leader (DPL) is chosen by Debian Developers in a yearly General Election; 
                                                
28 The FTP Masters are also in charge of maintaining the technical infrastructure that supports the 
archive. For a summary of their functions refer to http://lists.debian.org/debian-
project/2005/02/msg00184.html.  
29 See Monga (2004) for further details.. 
30 See http://www.infodrom.org/~joey/Vortraege/2005-06-23 and http://qa.debian.org/ for further 
information on these special teams.  
31 For a detailed description of the New Maintainer Process see 
http://www.debian.org/devel/join/newmaint and Wallach et al (2005) 
32 See O’Mahony and Ferraro (2004), and Coleman (2005) for further details regarding the principles 
according to which Debian’s Web of Trust is organised, and examples of the procedures used to test an 
applicant’s technical expertise and ideological commitment to Debian. 
33 See the Debian Constitution Version 1.2 (http://www.debian.org/devel/constitution) for a detailed 
description of each of the different positions and roles in the Debian organisational scheme. 
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she is the official representative of Debian, responsible for defining the project’s 
vision, and has the right to make urgent decisions, appoint a Technical Committee in 
charge of conflict-resolution, and lend her authority to other developers (including the 
aforementioned release manager). 
  
Debian History 
 
Debian has often been described as an initiative that was launched with the aim of 
creating a Linux Distribution that would be “true” to the Free Software principles. An 
analysis of available documents and public discussions shows, however, that there 
was an important element of pragmatism in the project founders’ motivations.  
According to one of them, the first reason for starting the project was discontent with 
the quality of existing Linux distributions.34  
 
In contrast to the focus on ‘Software Freedom’ of these accounts, the initial Debian 
Manifesto emphasises “quality” and “responsiveness to the needs of the user 
community,” without any references to the advancement of a specific political 
agenda. The Free Software Foundation (FSF) is only mentioned in the context of 
practical issues related to CD-ROM distribution. Although the FSF supported Debian 
with a grant, there was an eventual split between both groups as a consequence of 
what was perceived to be the latter group’s political interference with the activities of 
the project35. 
 
Debian’s association with FSF raised the profile of the project creating an influx of 
politically motivated developers. This, together with the growing interest of 
commercial firms and potential contributors not as knowledgeable or vocal about 
software freedom issues, generated disagreements and confusion, and led to the 
                                                
34 See the Debian Manifesto, which accompanied the Distribution’s launch at 
http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/project-history/ap-manifesto.en.html 
35 According to a former project leader “We had a little contretemps (sic) with FSF because we didn't 
want to be under their direction, and Richard Stallman said some things that got people on the net 
angry, but it's not like it was some kind of war”. http://lists.debian.org/debian-
devel/1996/10/msg01149.html  
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eventual definition of the project’s policy on this area36. As a developer recalls in an 
interview published in O’Mahony (2002): 
 
“A guy who is now with [open source firm] had suggested putting a 
particular package in [to the Debian distribution]. And I felt that the 
package was not free software. And I objected to it, […] I needed 
more than “I don’t like it” to be my objection [….] I got this idea that 
there should be a social contract between Debian and the free software 
community that says how that Linux distribution should behave. So I 
decided that I could justify the choice of what goes in Debian and what 
does not, that we could have a Debian Social Contract.” 
 
The Debian Social Contract (DSC) and the Debian Free Software Guidelines (DFSG) 
made explicit the project’s ideological commitment to the tenets of Free Software, 
codifying the beliefs and values that participants in the project were expected to 
uphold. This was associated with a shift from the initial pragmatism and focus on 
quality and usability towards a stronger emphasis on ideological and political issues. 
A developer, dissatisfied with this trend, states quite starkly “Free software was a tail 
that eventually wagged the dog”37. 
 
The next step in the institutional evolution of the project was the creation, in 1998, of 
the Debian Constitution, a formal framework to regulate the election of the DPL: this 
was made necessary by a number of conflicts between the extant leader (who had 
inherited his position from the project founder) and several developers. There were 
concerns about a perceived illegitimacy in the exercise of authority by the DPL, 
excessively heavy-handed and intrusive according to some developers38. Additionally, 
his focus on “bringing Debian to the masses” went against the wishes of an important 
                                                
36 See http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/1996/06/msg00600.html for a discussion on this matter: 
When the Project leader suggests “dropping the non-free directory anditscontents from Debian. We 
don't really need anything in there, and it would be nice to get closer to the free software ideal” some 
developers reply that (most Debian users- and developers) “are probably interested more in a useful 
system and less in political goals like having 100% (not 99%) free software”). 
37 http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2000/06/msg01194.html . This constitutes another illustration 
between the principles of ‘free software’ and ‘freedom to choose whatever software does the job’ 
present in many F/LOS communities (Elliot and Scacchi 92003)). 
38 See http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/1997/09/msg00966.html for an example of a situation where 
the project leader was perceived to be interfering with the development of the package “Deity”.   
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segment of the community (who preferred to focus on the technical needs of the 
“hacker” audience)39.  
 
“While now a large number of people think that (second project leader) was 
the best thing since sliced bread, lots of people were pissed off back then 
with him commanding people around. And what was the result? A 
Constitution that would ensure that no leader would ever have such power 
again”40 
 
Debian had reached the organisational milestone at which the size and degree of 
complexity where decision-making through protracted debate was unfeasible.  In 
some cases it would be necessary for the leader to exercise her authority in order to 
settle controversial matters. In order to do this she would need political legitimacy, 
obtained through her success in the Debian General Elections. Concerns about a 
potential slide of Debian into “Authoritarianism” led to the inclusion in the Debian 
Constitution of safeguards to avoid an excessive concentration of power in the hands 
of the DPL and other officers.41  
 
The launch, in 1998, of the Open Source Initiative and the creation of a legal “Open 
Source Definition” inspired by the DFSG raised Debian’s profile even further, and led 
to a rapid surge in the number of new contributors, which resulted in what O’Mahony 
(2003) and Coleman (2005) refer to as the “membership crisis,” a second milestone in 
Debian’s organisational evolution. Veteran members of the project put in doubt the 
technical expertise and commitment of these “novices”: It was argued that they 
uploaded low quality packages to the distribution and were responsible for a growth 
in the project’s bug-count (O’Mahony (2004) p. 21) and that their ideological 
commitment to the project was doubtful. Concerns were also voiced about the risk of 
malicious new maintainers obtaining access to the project’s code repositories and 
uploading security-compromised packages to the distribution.  
 
                                                
39 See his resignation notice at http://old.lwn.net/lwn/1998/0319/resign.html  
40 http://www.cyrius.com/journal/2006/03/09 (2003-2004 DPL’s blog). 
41 Including the possibility of the community overriding the DPL in a ‘general resolution’, or 
restrictions of her rights including the expulsion of other developers.  
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Accordingly, previous channels for entrance in the project were closed and eventually 
replaced with the New Maintainer Process (NMP), a formal procedure for gaining 
membership in Debian including a verification of the new maintainer’s identity and 
an examination of her commitment to Debian’s philosophy, as well as her technical 
expertise42. 
 
Although the NMP constitutes the last step in Debian’s institutional evolution as of 
the Spring of 2007, there have been further controversies between developers that 
have, for example, led some to propose further regulations in the project, such as a 
binding Code of Conduct for the mailing lists43.  More interesting, for the purposes of 
this paper, is the polemic concerning the (arguably) excessive power wielded by a 
cadre of individuals in special positions such as Debian Account Manager, FTP 
Master and other special teams. This group (referred to as “the Cabal” by 
disenfranchised developers) has been accused of lack of responsiveness and 
accountability to the rest of the community and of trying to manipulate Debian’s 
evolution secretly, making decisions about the project after private meetings outside 
of the community’s scrutiny. The polemic proposal for Debian’s future evolution 
elaborated by the release team (comprising release assistants and FTP Masters) during 
a private meeting held Vancouver in March 2005 constitutes an example of this. This 
proposal, which implied the discontinuation of the project’s support for several 
hardware architectures, was interpreted as an attempt to hijack the control of Debian 
from the community, and led to intense arguments in the developer mailing lists.44.  
 
Controversies about the balance of power inside Debian came to the forefront again in 
March 2006, when the then Stable Release Manager resigned from his position with 
the following comment: 
 
“I'm sick of being left in the void.  I'm sick of ftp masters not answering 
mails from the stable release manager to negotiate a timeline.  I'm sick of 
ftp masters suddenly creating arbitrary preconditions for stable updates. 
                                                
42 See Wallach, Allan and Harries (2005) for a history and detailed description of the process. 
43 See http://www.gatago.com/linux/debian/vote/8051951.html for a debate about this issue in the 
context of 2006 Debian General Elections. 
44 See http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2005/12/msg00574.html for criticisms in respect to the first 
area.  See Coleman (2005), as well as the original discussion at http://lists.debian.org/debian-
devel/2005/03/thrd2.html  regarding the Vancouver memo “flamefest”. 
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I'm sick of having to ask again and again and being constantly blocked by 
them. I'm sick of this entire situation. It makes me ill, angry and utterly 
frustrated.  It causes me being frustrated of Debian and unable to work on 
other issues, needing a rest more often than planned.  I should do better 
with my limited life”45 
 
This resignation led to requests for the dismissal of a particularly controversial 
FTP Master from his position. It was argued that according to the Debian 
Constitution, this individual could be relieved from his duties by the DPL. These 
calls have so far been ignored or rebutted. It has been argued that individuals in 
positions such as FTP Master “might be better thought of as "infrastructure 
maintainers" instead (of as project delegates), which implies a different 
relationship to the DPL.”46. Some developers have showed their concern about a 
difficult transition for the project in case an aggressive course of action is taken. 47 
 
Analysis 
 
We understand the history of Debian as a process in which project growth (both 
social and technical) has given rise to disruptive processes that have been addressed 
through the implementation of institutional strategies aimed at constraining diversity 
(by establishing the principles that regulate the functioning of the project, codifying 
its goals and values and promoting conformance by new participants) and reduce the 
co-ordination costs incurred as a consequence of increased complexity (by enforcing 
a degree of standardisation in development procedures and techniques and 
establishing a number of quality assurance measures). The values with which it is 
necessary to agree in order to become a member of the Debian ‘epistemic 
community’ have been clearly established in the Debian Social Contract, and the 
processes of legitimate peripheral participation through which this membership is 
acquired has been formalised into the New Maintainer Process. The Debian 
Constitution constitutes a third element legitimising the exercise of authority (the 
third ‘leg’ of our conceptual triad). 
                                                
45 http://lwn.net/Articles/174930/ . See  
46 Interview with 2005-2006 Debian Project Leader available at 
http://linux.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/11/1931202  
47 http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2005/12/msg00633.html  
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This process is rife with controversy, as the creation and rearrangement of 
institutional structures has been perceived to clash with essential tenets of F/LOS 
development such as openness or freedom, and provoked shifts in the power (and 
knowledge) structure of the project. It is important to highlight that the establishment 
of goals, norms, participation criteria and standard work practices constitutes an 
exercise of authority by those individuals in positions of leadership inside the project, 
and has been opposed by participants who support different visions of its future. Their 
implementation has contributed to reduce instability, but has also led to the 
emergence of new problems such as an alleged slowing of the admissions process, a 
deficit in innovation and a sluggish cycle of releases. We now examine these issues. 
 
A selection mechanism for constraining diversity is necessary in order to minimise the 
scope of conflict between participants with different beliefs about desirable 
development techniques, architectures and intermediate and final goals for the project. 
As we observed earlier, devising such a selection mechanism is not straightforward 
and it is nearly impossible if there is no clarity about what the participants in the 
project are expected to believe or strive for.  In such cases, conflict will inevitably 
ensue with the potentially catastrophic selection mechanism of exit or forking taking 
hold as different constituencies inside the community pull in different directions. The 
potential for this becomes higher as the project grows.  Debian’s increasing popularity 
brought an influx of developers with different “visions” about the purposes of the 
project, and this made it necessary to set down policies and goals (that until then had 
remained tacit and vague) in order to avoid continuous discussion and controversy 
which would stall or disrupt the project. 
  
The authority of the project leaders determined the result of this process: developers 
who were strongly committed to the ideological tenets of Free Software had reached, 
through continuous, high quality contributions, influential positions inside the project, 
from which they set their political and technical agenda.  This agenda was 
implemented in an explicit (and permanent) manner once their divergences with the 
pragmatist faction (less strict about, for example, the inclusion of non-free software in 
the distribution) became evident. The DSC and the DSFG were thus erected as 
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explicit barriers to the entrance to the project of potential dissenters (sources of 
conflict), and as guides for current members. As O’Mahony (2006) argues: 
 
“The process of creating these two documents formalized the 
previously unarticulated values upon which the group was founded. It 
also helped ensure that a growing body of contributors new to the 
group’s history and norms could share them. Sources both internal and 
external to the project suggest that gaining internal consensus of the 
group’s mission and articulating a basis of authority was critical in 
preserving the project from commercial interests”. (p. 261). 
 
The Debian Constitution can be seen as a codification of the project’s vision that has 
the goal of communicating to potential entrants what will be expected of them if they 
decide to join the project, and discouraging from participation those individuals 
whose values (e.g. more tolerant of proprietary software) conflict with the ‘status 
quo’. Nevertheless, if thought of as a ‘contract,’ its non-binding and abstract nature 
would not have been sufficient to keep developers opposing or ill-informed about the 
tenets of F/LOS software (or devoid of the necessary technical skills) from entering 
the project.  In a context of rapid population growth (which made monitoring of 
participant behaviour increasingly difficult), this led to the ‘membership crisis’. This 
again provoked institutional change, that is, the implementation of a New Maintainer 
Process with the goal of guaranteeing that rules such as those codified in the DSC and 
DSFG would be understood and respected by new developers.  The aim was to 
diminish the risk of malicious, unaware or rebellious individuals entering the project.   
 
The Debian NMP, with its period of “internship”, during which a candidate works in 
close collaboration with a sponsor (mentor) and an Application Manager formalises a 
legitimate peripheral participation process that had previously been embedded in the 
day-to-day activities of the community. It specifies a number of criteria that an 
applicant should fulfil in order to become full member of Debian.  An applicant who 
has gone through the NMP can be expected to know the rules of the project, and to 
contribute according to them. 
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Also, by raising the barriers to participation in the project, the NMP discourages 
casual contributors whose inconsistent participation patterns (“wrong attitude”) might 
negatively affect the quality of the distribution.  
 
Some members of Debian have complained about the severity of the NMP 
requirements (especially in respect to its philosophical and political topics), and the 
length of time it takes to finalise it, which create important barriers to entrance into 
the project. In response to these criticisms, it has been argued that casual applicants to 
Debian membership need to be filtered out of the NMP as soon as possible in order to 
avoid wasting the time of volunteer Application Managers, and that the creation of an 
explicit process for the acquisition of membership makes Debian “more inclusive” 
than other projects such as the BSD Unix Distribution where, while the 
 
“…gurus accepted contributions from those who were not already 
participating on the project, it was difficult to pierce the inner circle of 
authority and become an actual member of the team. This (…) produced 
an unacceptable form of project participation, characterized by a 
degraded elitism that failed to equalize the terrain on which developers 
could prove their worth”. (Coleman, 2005, pp. 12-13) 
 
The NMP establishes clearly the requisites for membership reduces the diversity of 
participant viewpoints to a manageable level through the enforcement of a specific 
Debian “mindset” or “attitude” (especially in the area of “software freedom”). It also 
lessens the costs of co-ordinating decentralised development efforts (and ensuring 
quality) by guaranteeing that new entrants are conversant with a number of skills and 
procedures that regulate development inside the project. 
 
Thus, the DSC, DSFG and NMP (and the technical policy manuals new applicants are 
expected to become familiar with as part of the latter) constitute institutional 
structures that promote specific goals and techniques inside the project and alignment 
in the understanding and compliance of new participants. However, this alignment 
does not preclude the need to make decisions about a multitude of issues such as 
determining the operational goals of a release, assessing the relative merits of 
different implementations of the same feature, or the stability of a package, 
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interpreting legal issues or appraising and punishing undesirable behaviours. The goal 
of the Debian Constitution is to legitimise decisions on these issues while avoiding 
excessive concentration of authority in the hands of an elite of developers.  Debian 
achieves this legitimisation by using governance structure that is democratically 
elected (sustained high quality contributions- i.e. knowledge about the project- still 
constitute one of the main appeals that a candidate offers), and second, exercised in a 
limited way without stepping into the “areas of expertise” (packages) of other 
developers48.    
 
This emphasis on democratic selection of leaders is not present in technical decision-
making, and using political tools such as Debian General Resolutions for these 
matters is clearly discouraged (Coleman, 2005). It is argued that technical 
controversies have a right answer that can be reached through argument and 
discussion, and that “voting blocks the methodology of open debate”49. Observation of 
the levels of technical bickering in Debian’s mailing list underscores the excessive 
optimism of this belief: there are several controversial areas where the possibility of 
closing a debate are curtailed by technical uncertainty and the heterogeneity of 
developers’ goals (at an operational, not necessarily political level); the unwillingness 
to exercise authority or ‘political leadership’, perceived to interfere with processes of 
technical debate has, according to a growing number of developers, impacted the 
project’s release cycle negatively.50 Discussions between candidates for the project 
leadership in recent years show dissatisfaction with the actual lack of action from past 
leaders. It is argued that Debian Officers need to exercise their authority more 
forcefully in order to “push the project forward”. 
 
 “I think that one of the biggest problems Debian is currently facing is 
the inability to make decisions. There are so many endless, completely 
futile (and repetitive) discussions going on. We need someone who 
comes in, tells people to shut up and makes a decision on behalf of the 
project. A decision people will follow, even if they personally disagree 
                                                
48 One of the main complaints about the second project leader was his perceived interference with the 
inner workings of one of Debian’s packages, Deity. 
49 Coleman (2005), p. 20. 
50 See 2007’s Debian Project Leader debate for evidence regarding the perceived problems that 
constant bickering and miscommunication have caused in the project (available at 
http://www.debian.org/vote/2007/suppl_001_debate ) 
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with it. But seriously, do you think our culture would currently accept 
such a leader? I can tell you from experience that even people who have 
been asking for a "strong" leader won't actually follow a leader who tells 
them to take a certain course of action”51 
 
This illustrates the strong barriers to modifying Debian’s organisational 
structure to establish more decisive structures and speed up decision-making 
and conflict resolution processes.  Such changes would clash with the main 
values of the project and would involve redistributions of power that were 
asymmetric with participants’ expertise.  The exercise of authority by a leader 
over another maintainer’s package would be difficult to legitimise in this 
context. According to our conceptual framework, the political processes through 
which authority is legitimised in Debian are not sufficiently aligned with the 
project’s informational architecture (which favours knowledge fragmentation, 
and henceforth, ‘political decentralisation’). If, as we argue, F/LOS 
communities only tolerate an individual’s exercise of authority over her areas of 
expertise, it seems that participants in Debian will be confined to decisive 
decision-making only inside the package they maintain.   
 
The conflict between de jure authority enacted through Debian elections, and de facto 
authority acquired via sustained participation and the ensuing accumulation of 
expertise is also illustrated by the divergences between the Debian officership and 
what dissenters have called ‘The Cabal’ (FTP Masters and Account Management). 
Although there is, in principle, a “division of powers” between these two groups, with 
the former taking care of high level “vision” and “co-ordination” issues, and the latter 
of infrastructure and quality, it seems that, once again, goals and policy are not so 
easy to extricate from the technical substrate where they are embedded, and this 
causes conflict. 
 
“Constant politicking” tolerated by a DPL without sufficient power to manage 
the community pro-actively have slowed Debian’s development to an extent 
                                                
51 Post in the blog of a former DPL: http://www.cyrius.com/journal/2006/03/09#being-dpl  
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some fear might endanger its survival. As a developer argued in his 28th August 
2006 resignation note from the project: 
 
“…over the past few weeks (months? Years?) it's become clear to 
me that Debian doesn't really seem to know who or what it's for. 
Arguments erupt over whether something is a deeply held principle 
or an accident of phrasing on the website; whether we should release 
more often or less often; whether free software is more important 
than our users having functional hardware.52” 
 
Concerns about the growth of Ubuntu, a GNU/Linux distribution based on 
Debian but developed more rapidly by a smaller team of paid developers have 
led to calls for the enforcement of a periodical release rate in Debian, for a more 
streamlined process for the inclusion of advanced features in stable releases, and 
even for the creation of a fund-raising structure to pay core developers for their 
work53.  Each of these examples aim to change the institutional setting of the 
project in order to modify its development process and outcomes, and illustrate 
the kind of debate about project goals (in this case innovation versus stability) 
that periodically takes place inside the community54. 
                                                
52 http://mjg59.livejournal.com/66647.html  
53 http://www.linux.com/article.pl?sid=06/09/21/1623232  
54 See the following discussion at the news-site Slashdot for representations of both points of view: 
http://linux.slashdot.org/comments.pl?threshold=5&mode=thread&commentsort=0&op=Change&sid=
192057   
 27 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this final section we outline the conclusions and limitations of our analysis and 
suggest avenues for further research. 
 
A tale about the bazaar 
 
This paper presents a cautionary tale about prevailing bazaar metaphor when 
applied to the analysis of F/LOS activities, and also when implemented in it55. We 
have focussed on a community where the conjugation of openness and growth has 
taken its toll in output delivery schedules and social stability. As we have shown, 
these problems have been tackled through institutional strategies that alter the 
balance between openness and stability, but that also lead to unintended 
consequences, such as development stagnation or decreases in participation.  
These observations suggest caution in employing an idealised model of the bazaar 
as an analytical metaphor: norms, values, membership processes and structures 
for governance appear to be essential in order to understand the productive and 
social dynamics of a project. To the extent that open source ways of working 
constitute an organisational innovation, it is an innovation with structural 
implications and contents.56 
 
Having established the relevance of focussing on F/LOS institutions, we have 
illustrated how the epistemic community and legitimate peripheral concepts, and 
their extension to include the emergence of hierarchies and processes governing 
authority distribution constitute useful tools for analysis of the evolution of the 
Debian community. In the case of Debian, this latter process, the delegation of 
power based on trust, is constrained by the decentralisation of the structures 
through which development takes place. This explains the difficulties faced by the 
Debian project leader when trying to exercise any sort of meaningful authority 
                                                
55 Our focus has been on Eric Raymond’s vision of F/LOS development, but our contention that 
decentralised accounts of the advantages of this model needs to be complemented with an analysis on 
the actual social and political institutions, and organisational structures through which work in F/LOS 
projects is accomplished are also relevant to the fruitful research program on User-Centric Innovations 
carried out by Eric von Hippel and his colleagues (see von Hippel, 2002). 
56 Further elaboration of these ideas may found in Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller (forthcoming). 
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over their projects – an experience that stands in contrast with the GNU/Linux 
kernel or the BSD UNIX distribution.  It also illuminates how the nature of 
technical platform for development (Debian’s package management system) 
influences the social structure of the community. In this sense, our specification 
of the processes of institutional emergence constrained by the nature of a project’s 
technical architecture complements the classification of F/LOS projects in 
different categories depending on their purposes, participation patterns and 
structures, (Nakakoji et al, 2002). It also appears linked to the description of the 
processes through which projects evolve (as for example, they move from initial 
stages of experimentation towards stability as more users start relying on them) 
offered in Nakakoji et al, 2002. 
 
Implications 
 
Our analysis has several implications relevant for F/LOS projects and companies 
intent on fostering F/LOS communities for support and co-development of their 
products: 
 
• Institutional structures are essential determinants of a project’s outcomes 
suggesting that special attention should be paid to their design and evolution 
including the explicit and implicit incentive structures that they create. 
• Technical knowledge about a project area is likely to be the primary source of 
legitimacy for exercises of authority inside it. Therefore, the nature of the 
platform adopted for development (which determines the form in which 
knowledge is accumulated or dispersed throughout the community), 
constrains management actions inside a project. 
• Decentralised platforms with components that interlink using standardised 
interfaces are easier to scale and employ to facilitate parallel development, but 
they also make it difficult and costly to oversee the quality of contributions, 
and to exercise authority pro-actively.  This may hinder, for example, 
architectural innovation or, as we have shown in the case of Debian, slow 
down development speed. 
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• On the other hand, “vertical structures” where contributions are processed 
upstream through “gatekeeper” positions (such is the case of the GNU/Linux 
project) may be overloaded by growth. 
• Establishing goals and norms early in the project life may avoid unproductive 
discussions or struggles for control over the project’s direction when the 
project has accumulated a more diverse group of participants. 
• Formalisation of institutional structures through the codification of project 
norms and values and joining procedures can simplify the negotiation 
involved in the legitimate participation processes, increase participants’ 
feeling of “ownership” over the project and sharpen the focus of discussions. 
However, they do not guarantee the elimination of conflict and they may 
discourage participation as well as being costly in terms of resources. 
 
Limitations and issues for further research 
 
The qualitative, exploratory and situated approach followed in this paper limits 
the generalisation of its conclusions.  Our results are based on evidence that 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
In particular, although our emphasis on controversies, disruptive processes and 
institutional reactions to them provides what we deem to be a healthy 
counterpoint to other, more optimistic, accounts of these projects’ evolution, on 
the downside it might lead to excessive weight being placed on the opinions and 
perceptions of conflictive and disgruntled participants or minority groups. In the 
Spring of 2007, Debian released Debian 4.0 with four times as many packages as 
its prior release, demonstrating that despite the sharp conflicts that we consider in 
this paper, the community is still very much alive and successful in its main 
purpose. 
 
The extent to which our results can be applied to other projects is limited, 
although preliminary research on other projects (Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller, 
2002) seems to support them. Nevertheless, further research focussing on other 
large projects such as for example Apache, BSD UNIX, Mozilla or Perl would be 
helpful. It would be particularly interesting to engage in a larger-scale quantitative 
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effort using the data available in F/LOS repositories such as SourceForge, 
Freshmeat or Savannah, in order to determine the extent to which our conclusions 
can be generalised to a broader collection of (medium size to large) F/LOS 
projects. This would require an operational definition of several of the variables 
we have defined in our analysis, such as “conflict”, “organisation”, “barriers to 
participation” or “project social performance”-- In terms of community 
sustainability -- a difficult but potentially rewarding effort. 
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